Contractualisation dans l'entreprise et Management de la conception industrielle : de la transaction vers la relation



The types of interactions studied here correspond to a formalization of commitments between actors with interdependent activities, in a context of uncertainty and incomplete information. Based on research on mechanisms set up to control coordination between actors in industrial design, we highlight conflict between coordination grounded in a "strictly" contractual approach, on the one hand, and "flexible" types of commitment which take advantage of an increase in information but may have high coordination costs, on the other. Our aim is to analyse the existence of a dual vision of contractualization within firms. On the basis of this idea, one will examine on the one hand, the impact of the residual rights over interface knowledge assets, on the other hand the interest of a dynamic contract reconciling explicit commitments and flexibility (to support mutual rights of access to complementary knowledge).


Internal contract;Coordination-Cooperation;Knowledge assets;Information

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